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dc.contributor.authorWeatherson, Brian James
dc.identifier.citationWeatherson , B J 2016 , ' Reply to Blackson ' , Journal of Philosophical Research , vol. 41 , pp. 73-75 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 244241593
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 01713948-2af8-4a88-8f72-ae5d219c605a
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85049138247
dc.description.abstractThomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Philosophical Researchen
dc.rightsCopyright 2016 Philosophy Documentation Center. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleReply to Blacksonen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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