Reply to Blackson
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Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
Weatherson , B J 2016 , ' Reply to Blackson ' Journal of Philosophical Research , vol 41 , pp. 73-75 . DOI: 10.5840/jpr201663072
Journal of Philosophical Research
Copyright 2016 Philosophy Documentation Center. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201663072
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