Reply to Blackson
Abstract
Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
Citation
Weatherson , B J 2016 , ' Reply to Blackson ' , Journal of Philosophical Research , vol. 41 , pp. 73-75 . https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr201663072
Publication
Journal of Philosophical Research
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
2153-7984Type
Journal article
Collections
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