Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies Research
The School has four major components: Philosophy, Social Anthropology, Film Studies and Academic Music.
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Recent Submissions
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Sosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacle
(2018-02-17) - Journal itemIn recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through ... -
Memory, belief and time
(2016-01-08) - Journal articleI argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained ... -
Debating irony and the ironic as a social phenomenon and a human capacity
(2014-11) - Journal articleWhat follows is a set of paired articles, followed by a statement by both authors where they debate their distinct positions. Both articles treat irony, but while Rapport looks to it as a possible liberal virtue, a means ... -
Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
(2016-04) - Journal articleAccording to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and ... -
Reply to Blackson
(2016) - Journal articleThomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative ...