Memory, belief and time
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I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
Weatherson , B J 2016 , ' Memory, belief and time ' , Canadian Journal of Philosophy , vol. 45 , no. 5-6 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
© 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
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