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dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-28T23:34:32Z
dc.date.available2016-08-28T23:34:32Z
dc.date.issued2016-04
dc.identifier.citationMcGrath , M 2016 , ' Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 173 , no. 4 , pp. 897-905 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 215729582
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 0f4a4871-15b3-4ad4-ba1f-6855249626cc
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84961129201
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/9389
dc.description.abstractAccording to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the ‘‘capacity view.’’ In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but non demonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.
dc.format.extent9
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7en
dc.subjectEvidenceen
dc.subjectPerceptual Justificationen
dc.subjectPerceptionen
dc.subjectContent of Experienceen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleSchellenberg on the epistemic force of experienceen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2016-08-28


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