Direct moral grounding and the legal model of moral normativity
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Whereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what we’re morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral requirements are directly grounded by non-normative facts. This isn’t, however, to say that there is no place in the picture for moral reasons. Moral reasons exist, and they’re grounded by moral requirements. Arguing for this picture of the moral sphere requires playing both offense and defense; this article provides the defense. I defend this view against the objections (1) that it must deny that one is generally blameworthy for having violated a moral requirement, (2) that it implies the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, (3) that it runs counter to an obviously true view of how moral deliberation should work, and (4) that it cannot explain why it feels as though figuring about what one is morally required to do often takes the form of thinking about what one’s moral reasons are.
Sachs , B A 2015 , ' Direct moral grounding and the legal model of moral normativity ' Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , vol 18 , no. 4 , pp. 703 - 716 . DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9598-0
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9598-0
DescriptionDate of acceptance: 05/04/2015
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