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dc.contributor.authorSachs, Benjamin Alan
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-29T23:32:11Z
dc.date.available2016-04-29T23:32:11Z
dc.date.issued2015-04
dc.identifier165917098
dc.identifierda7fea2b-1cee-49d9-b6e2-fc8b5fcf8e04
dc.identifier84938423071
dc.identifier000358782500004
dc.identifier.citationSachs , B A 2015 , ' Direct moral grounding and the legal model of moral normativity ' , Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , vol. 18 , no. 4 , pp. 703 - 716 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9598-0en
dc.identifier.issn1386-2820
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-2307-7620/work/69029288
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/8708
dc.descriptionDate of acceptance: 05/04/2015en
dc.description.abstractWhereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what we’re morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral requirements are directly grounded by non-normative facts. This isn’t, however, to say that there is no place in the picture for moral reasons. Moral reasons exist, and they’re grounded by moral requirements. Arguing for this picture of the moral sphere requires playing both offense and defense; this article provides the defense. I defend this view against the objections (1) that it must deny that one is generally blameworthy for having violated a moral requirement, (2) that it implies the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, (3) that it runs counter to an obviously true view of how moral deliberation should work, and (4) that it cannot explain why it feels as though figuring about what one is morally required to do often takes the form of thinking about what one’s moral reasons are.
dc.format.extent233798
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofEthical Theory and Moral Practiceen
dc.subjectMoral reasonsen
dc.subjectMoral requirementsen
dc.subjectGroundingen
dc.subjectBlameworthinessen
dc.subjectMoral deliberationen
dc.subjectReasons-firsten
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleDirect moral grounding and the legal model of moral normativityen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Institute of Legal and Constitutional Researchen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9598-0
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2016-04-30


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