Contrastive reasons and promotion
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A promising but underexplored view about normative reasons is contrastivism, which holds that considerations are fundamentally reasons for things only relative to sets of alternatives. Contrastivism gains an advantage by holding that reasons relative to different sets of alternatives can be independent of one another. But this feature also raises a serious problem: we need some way of constraining this independence. I develop a version of contrastivism that provides the needed constraints and that is independently motivated by the widespread idea that reasons involve the promotion of various kinds of objectives.
Snedegar , J 2014 , ' Contrastive reasons and promotion ' , Ethics , vol. 125 , no. 1 , pp. 39-63 . https://doi.org/10.1086/677025
© 2010. University of Chicago Press. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by University of Chicago Press in Ethics, October 2014, available online at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/10.1086/677025
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