Now showing items 1-10 of 10

    • Contrastive reasons and promotion 

      Snedegar, Justin (2014-10) - Journal article
      A promising but underexplored view about normative reasons is contrastivism, which holds that considerations are fundamentally reasons for things only relative to sets of alternatives. Contrastivism gains an advantage by ...
    • Contrastivism about reasons and ought 

      Snedegar, Justin (2015-06-04) - Journal article
      Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism ...
    • Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts 

      Snedegar, Justin (Springer, 2014) - Book item
      Contrastivism about `ought' holds that `ought' claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets of mutually exclusive but not necessarily jointly exhaustive alternatives. This kind of theory can solve puzzles that face ...
    • Errol Lord and Barry Maguire, eds., Weighing reasons 

      Snedegar, Justin (2017-10) - Journal item
    • Invariance and intensionality : new perspectives on logicality 

      Grossi, Marco (University of St Andrews, 2018-12-07) - Thesis
      What are logical notions? According to a very popular proposal, a logical notion is something invariant under some “transformation” of objects, usually permutations or isomorphisms. The first chapter is about extending ...
    • Kant's concept of the good 

      Tonissen, Bas Ben Martien; Snedegar, Justin (University of St Andrews, 2018) - Thesis
      This dissertation asks what Kant means when he talks about the good, and what role this concept plays in his ethical theory. It is divided into three chapters. The first examines the context in which this question was first ...
    • The nexus of control: intentional activity and moral accountability 

      Conradie, Niël (University of St Andrews, 2018-06-28) - Thesis
      There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility ...
    • Reasons for and reasons against 

      Snedegar, Justin (2018-03) - Journal article
      What an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus ...
    • Reasons, oughts, and requirements 

      Snedegar, Justin (Oxford University Press, 2016-08-04) - Book item
      This paper raises a challenge for the recently popular reasons first approach to normativity, according to which all normative notions can be explained in terms of reasons. The reasons first theorist owes us an account of ...
    • "You want me to do what?!" : a reasonable response to overly demanding moral theories 

      Slater, Joe (University of St Andrews, 2018) - Thesis
      This thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what ...