Show simple item record

Files in this item


Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorSnedegar, Justin
dc.identifier.citationSnedegar , J 2014 , ' Contrastive reasons and promotion ' , Ethics , vol. 125 , no. 1 , pp. 39-63 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 88333374
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3873d49a-4087-4372-8ccd-cddb2220329c
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84924207118
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000342619300003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-2552-0702/work/64697922
dc.description.abstractA promising but underexplored view about normative reasons is contrastivism, which holds that considerations are fundamentally reasons for things only relative to sets of alternatives. Contrastivism gains an advantage by holding that reasons relative to different sets of alternatives can be independent of one another. But this feature also raises a serious problem: we need some way of constraining this independence. I develop a version of contrastivism that provides the needed constraints and that is independently motivated by the widespread idea that reasons involve the promotion of various kinds of objectives.
dc.rights© 2010. University of Chicago Press. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by University of Chicago Press in Ethics, October 2014, available online at:
dc.subjectBJ Ethicsen
dc.titleContrastive reasons and promotionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record