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dc.contributor.authorSnedegar, Justin
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-01T23:11:28Z
dc.date.available2015-10-01T23:11:28Z
dc.date.issued2014-10
dc.identifier.citationSnedegar , J 2014 , ' Contrastive reasons and promotion ' , Ethics , vol. 125 , no. 1 , pp. 39-63 . https://doi.org/10.1086/677025en
dc.identifier.issn0014-1704
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 88333374
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3873d49a-4087-4372-8ccd-cddb2220329c
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84924207118
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000342619300003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-2552-0702/work/64697922
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/7574
dc.description.abstractA promising but underexplored view about normative reasons is contrastivism, which holds that considerations are fundamentally reasons for things only relative to sets of alternatives. Contrastivism gains an advantage by holding that reasons relative to different sets of alternatives can be independent of one another. But this feature also raises a serious problem: we need some way of constraining this independence. I develop a version of contrastivism that provides the needed constraints and that is independently motivated by the widespread idea that reasons involve the promotion of various kinds of objectives.
dc.format.extent25
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofEthicsen
dc.rights© 2010. University of Chicago Press. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by University of Chicago Press in Ethics, October 2014, available online at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/10.1086/677025en
dc.subjectBJ Ethicsen
dc.subject.lccBJen
dc.titleContrastive reasons and promotionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/677025
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2015-10-01


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