Lesser-evil justifications : a reply to Frowe
Date
04/08/2022Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents’ permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act on their lesser-evil justifications. Our primary task is to refute Frowe’s flagship argument. Secondarily, it is to sketch a positive case for nonconsequentialist orthodoxy.
Citation
Gordon-Solmon , K & Pummer , T G 2022 , ' Lesser-evil justifications : a reply to Frowe ' , Law and Philosophy , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-022-09454-w
Publication
Law and Philosophy
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0167-5249Type
Journal article
Description
For funding, Kerah Gordon-Solmon is grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.Collections
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