Deliberation, reasons, and alternatives
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A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question‐directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.
Snedegar , J 2019 , ' Deliberation, reasons, and alternatives ' , Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 100 , no. 3 , pp. 682-702 . https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12262
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Copyright © 2018 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2018 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12262
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