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dc.contributor.authorSnedegar, Justin
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-05T00:38:08Z
dc.date.available2020-11-05T00:38:08Z
dc.date.issued2019-09-27
dc.identifier.citationSnedegar , J 2019 , ' Deliberation, reasons, and alternatives ' , Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 100 , no. 3 , pp. 682-702 . https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12262en
dc.identifier.issn0279-0750
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 256174085
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: fb780b0e-4514-4600-9890-3a21d6770676
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85056088613
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-2552-0702/work/64697915
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000487838700001
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/20903
dc.description.abstractA plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question‐directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPacific Philosophical Quarterlyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2018 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2018 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12262en
dc.subjectDeliberationen
dc.subjectReasonsen
dc.subjectAlternativesen
dc.subjectEthicsen
dc.subjectReasoningen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleDeliberation, reasons, and alternativesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12262
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-11-05


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