Original sin, the Fall, and epistemic self-trust
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In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.
Rutledge , J C 2018 , ' Original sin, the Fall, and epistemic self-trust ' , Theologica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology , vol. 2 , no. 1 , pp. 84-94 . https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303
Theologica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
Copyright (c) 2018 Jonathan C. Rutledge. This is an open access article, licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND licence.
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