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dc.contributor.authorBadura, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorBerto, Francesco
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-03T16:30:06Z
dc.date.available2018-09-03T16:30:06Z
dc.date.issued2018-02-27
dc.identifier.citationBadura , C & Berto , F 2018 , ' Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision ' , Australasian Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698en
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 255688631
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 2024905d-04ea-40fd-9e14-163909a8c919
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85042919505
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132030
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/15951
dc.descriptionFranz Berto’s research was funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Consolidator grant no. 681404, ‘The Logic of Conceivability’. Christopher Badura’s research was funded by the Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3].en
dc.description.abstractWe present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
dc.format.extent16
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofAustralasian Journal of Philosophyen
dc.rights© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.en
dc.subjectImpossible worldsen
dc.subjectInconsistent fictionen
dc.subjectSylvan's boxen
dc.subjectTruth in fictionen
dc.subjectBelief revisionen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleTruth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revisionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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