Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision
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We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's  ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
Badura , C & Berto , F 2018 , ' Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision ' , Australasian Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
DescriptionFranz Berto’s research was funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Consolidator grant no. 681404, ‘The Logic of Conceivability’. Christopher Badura’s research was funded by the Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3].
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