Reasons, oughts, and requirements
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This paper raises a challenge for the recently popular reasons first approach to normativity, according to which all normative notions can be explained in terms of reasons. The reasons first theorist owes us an account of how these explanations go for all other normative notions. I focus here on requirement, and to a lesser extent, permission. There is a very plausible, widely accepted account of the relationship between your reasons and what you ought to do|roughly, what you ought to do is just what you have most reason to do. But it is important to distinguish what you ought to do and what you are required to do. So we still need to give some account of the relationship between reasons and requirements, and relatedly, between reasons and permission. This is less straightforward than giving an account of ought in terms of reasons. I focus in this paper on a strategy I call the Two Kinds of Reasons strategy, and argue that it faces serious obstacles.
Snedegar , J 2016 , Reasons, oughts, and requirements . in R Shafer-Landau (ed.) , Oxford Studies in Metaethics . vol. 11 , Oxford University Press , pp. 155-181 .
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Non peer reviewed
Copyright © Oxford University Press / the author 2016. This is a draft of a chapter published in R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press., reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-metaethics-11-9780198784647
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