Reasons, oughts, and requirements
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The reasons first approach holds that all other normative concepts can be explained by reasons. It promises to unify the normative domain, telling us what makes any normative concept normative. But the reasons first theorist then has to give us analyses of all other normative concepts in terms of reasons. Though there is a natural account of “ought” in terms of reasons, analyses of other concepts are more difficult. The distinction between what you ought and what you are required to do necessitates a reasons first account of requirement that respects this distinction. The Two Kinds of Reasons strategy appeals to one kind of reason that explains oughts and one that explains requirements. But while the concepts are distinct, they bear important structural relationships to one another which the Two Kinds of Reasons strategy threatens to miss. After two existing implementations are rejected, a potential way forward is suggested.
Snedegar , J 2016 , Reasons, oughts, and requirements . in R Shafer-Landau (ed.) , Oxford Studies in Metaethics : 11 . Oxford Studies in Metaethics , vol. 11 , Oxford University Press , pp. 155-181 . https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0007
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Non peer reviewed
Copyright © Oxford University Press / the author 2016. This is a draft of a chapter published in R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press., reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-metaethics-11-9780198784647
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