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Reasons, oughts, and requirements
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dc.contributor.author | Snedegar, Justin | |
dc.contributor.editor | Shafer-Landau, Russ | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-03T23:31:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-03T23:31:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-08-04 | |
dc.identifier | 207491175 | |
dc.identifier | 6a7d6fde-ea96-4f90-b70c-7b0c2ed16ef6 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Snedegar , J 2016 , Reasons, oughts, and requirements . in R Shafer-Landau (ed.) , Oxford Studies in Metaethics : 11 . Oxford Studies in Metaethics , vol. 11 , Oxford University Press , pp. 155-181 . https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0007 | en |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9780198784647 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9780198784654 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9780191828775 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0002-2552-0702/work/64697910 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15766 | |
dc.description.abstract | The reasons first approach holds that all other normative concepts can be explained by reasons. It promises to unify the normative domain, telling us what makes any normative concept normative. But the reasons first theorist then has to give us analyses of all other normative concepts in terms of reasons. Though there is a natural account of “ought” in terms of reasons, analyses of other concepts are more difficult. The distinction between what you ought and what you are required to do necessitates a reasons first account of requirement that respects this distinction. The Two Kinds of Reasons strategy appeals to one kind of reason that explains oughts and one that explains requirements. But while the concepts are distinct, they bear important structural relationships to one another which the Two Kinds of Reasons strategy threatens to miss. After two existing implementations are rejected, a potential way forward is suggested. | |
dc.format.extent | 243361 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Oxford Studies in Metaethics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Oxford Studies in Metaethics | en |
dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | en |
dc.subject | BDC | en |
dc.subject | R2C | en |
dc.subject.lcc | B1 | en |
dc.title | Reasons, oughts, and requirements | en |
dc.type | Book item | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0007 | |
dc.description.status | Non peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.embargoedUntil | 2018-08-04 | |
dc.identifier.url | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-metaethics-11-9780198784647 | en |
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