Now showing items 21-25 of 26

    • Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience 

      McGrath, Matthew (2016-04) - Journal article
      According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and ...
    • Reply to Blackson 

      Weatherson, Brian James (2016) - Journal article
      Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative ...
    • Indexicality, transparency, and mental files 

      Ball, Derek Nelson (2014) - Journal article
      Francois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for ...
    • Recombination and paradox 

      Uzquiano, Gabriel (2015-08) - Journal article
    • Why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong 

      Sachs, Benjamin Alan (2013) - Journal article
      It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and ...