A test of the submentalizing hypothesis : apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control
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Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.
Krupenye , C , Kano , F , Hirata , S , Call , J & Tomasello , M 2017 , ' A test of the submentalizing hypothesis : apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control ' , Communicative and Integrative Biology , vol. 10 , no. 4 , e1343771 . https://doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771 , https://doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2017.1343771
Communicative and Integrative Biology
© 2017 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis© Christopher Krupenye, Fumihiro Kano, Satoshi Hirata, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.