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dc.contributor.authorKrupenye, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorKano, Fumihiro
dc.contributor.authorHirata, Satoshi
dc.contributor.authorCall, Josep
dc.contributor.authorTomasello, Michael
dc.identifier.citationKrupenye , C , Kano , F , Hirata , S , Call , J & Tomasello , M 2017 , ' A test of the submentalizing hypothesis : apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control ' , Communicative and Integrative Biology , vol. 10 , no. 4 , e1343771 . ,
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 250474686
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 474735ed-82df-4d00-8deb-2c12094e65f7
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:FA881CBD78828086280C8C78F0AF9374
dc.identifier.otherPubMed: 28919941
dc.identifier.otherPubMedCentral: PMC5595417
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-8597-8336/work/37477959
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-2029-1872/work/43388040
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85051770543
dc.descriptionFinancial support came from Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (K-CONNEX to FK), Japan Society for Promotion of Science (KAKENHI 26885040, 16K21108 to FK), JSPS (KAKENHI 26245069, 24000001 to SH), and European Research Council (Synergy grant 609819 SOMICS to JC).en
dc.description.abstractMuch debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.
dc.relation.ispartofCommunicative and Integrative Biologyen
dc.rights© 2017 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis© Christopher Krupenye, Fumihiro Kano, Satoshi Hirata, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.en
dc.subjectGreat apeen
dc.subjectSocial cognitionen
dc.subjectFalse belief understandingen
dc.subjectTheory of minden
dc.subjectCognitive evolutionen
dc.subjectBF Psychologyen
dc.titleA test of the submentalizing hypothesis : apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate controlen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorEuropean Research Councilen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Psychology and Neuroscienceen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Social Learning & Cognitive Evolutionen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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