Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality
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A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.
Čopič , J & Ponsati Obiols , C 2016 , ' Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality ' Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 163 , pp. 276-287 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
Journal of Economic Theory
Copyright © 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
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