Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality

dc.contributor.author	Čopič, Jernej
dc.contributor.author	Ponsati Obiols, Clara
dc.date.accessioned	2017-06-29T23:33:14Z
dc.date.available	2017-06-29T23:33:14Z
dc.date.issued	2016-05
dc.identifier	240104769
dc.identifier	2080dd40-83be-4d63-b106-a12fde6c8430
dc.identifier	84957536853
dc.identifier	000375812600010
dc.identifier.citation	Čopič , J & Ponsati Obiols , C 2016 , ' Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality ' , Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 163 , pp. 276-287 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008	en
dc.identifier.issn	0022-0531
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11119
dc.description.abstract	A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.
dc.format.extent	292621
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economic Theory	en
dc.subject	Bilateral trade	en
dc.subject	Incomplete information	en
dc.subject	Mechanism design	en
dc.subject	Robustness	en
dc.subject	Efficiency	en
dc.subject	HB Economic Theory	en
dc.subject	BDC	en
dc.subject	R2C	en
dc.subject.lcc	HB	en
dc.title	Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. School of Economics and Finance	en
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed	en
dc.date.embargoedUntil	2017-06-29