Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorČopič, Jernej
dc.contributor.authorPonsati Obiols, Clara
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-29T23:33:14Z
dc.date.available2017-06-29T23:33:14Z
dc.date.issued2016-05
dc.identifier.citationČopič , J & Ponsati Obiols , C 2016 , ' Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality ' Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 163 , pp. 276-287 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008en
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 240104769
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 2080dd40-83be-4d63-b106-a12fde6c8430
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84957536853
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/11119
dc.description.abstractA risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theoryen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008en
dc.subjectBilateral tradeen
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen
dc.subjectMechanism designen
dc.subjectRobustnessen
dc.subjectEfficiencyen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleOptimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutralityen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2017-06-29


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record