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Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality
Item metadata
dc.contributor.author | Čopič, Jernej | |
dc.contributor.author | Ponsati Obiols, Clara | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-29T23:33:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-29T23:33:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-05 | |
dc.identifier | 240104769 | |
dc.identifier | 2080dd40-83be-4d63-b106-a12fde6c8430 | |
dc.identifier | 84957536853 | |
dc.identifier | 000375812600010 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Čopič , J & Ponsati Obiols , C 2016 , ' Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality ' , Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 163 , pp. 276-287 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11119 | |
dc.description.abstract | A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices. | |
dc.format.extent | 292621 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | en |
dc.subject | Bilateral trade | en |
dc.subject | Incomplete information | en |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | en |
dc.subject | Robustness | en |
dc.subject | Efficiency | en |
dc.subject | HB Economic Theory | en |
dc.subject | BDC | en |
dc.subject | R2C | en |
dc.subject.lcc | HB | en |
dc.title | Optimal robust bilateral trade : risk neutrality | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. School of Economics and Finance | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.embargoedUntil | 2017-06-29 |
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