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Contrastivism about reasons and ought

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carao_accepted_manuscript.pdf (128.8Kb)
Date
04/06/2015
Author
Snedegar, Justin
Keywords
B Philosophy (General)
Metadata
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Abstract
Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism about the central normative concepts of reasons and ought. Contrastivism about reasons says that a consideration may be a reason for an action A rather than one alternative, B, but may not be a reason for A rather than some other alternative, C. Likewise, contrastivism about ought says that it might be that you ought to perform action A rather than action B, while it is not the case that you ought to perform A rather than some other alternative, C. It explores the shape and motivations for, and the relationship between, these contrastivist theories.
Citation
Snedegar , J 2015 , ' Contrastivism about reasons and ought ' , Philosophy Compass , vol. 10 , no. 6 , pp. 379-388 . https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12231
Publication
Philosophy Compass
Status
Peer reviewed
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12231
ISSN
1747-9991
Type
Journal article
Rights
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Snedegar, J (2015), Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought. Philosophy Compass, 10, 379–388, which has been published in final form at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12231. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
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  • University of St Andrews Research
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10905

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