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dc.contributor.authorSnedegar, Justin
dc.identifier.citationSnedegar , J 2015 , ' Contrastivism about reasons and ought ' , Philosophy Compass , vol. 10 , no. 6 , pp. 379-388 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 175122331
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 61cb01d3-9c86-4003-8852-b40e4d8e2e5f
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84930691853
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000359832100003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-2552-0702/work/64697917
dc.description.abstractContrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism about the central normative concepts of reasons and ought. Contrastivism about reasons says that a consideration may be a reason for an action A rather than one alternative, B, but may not be a reason for A rather than some other alternative, C. Likewise, contrastivism about ought says that it might be that you ought to perform action A rather than action B, while it is not the case that you ought to perform A rather than some other alternative, C. It explores the shape and motivations for, and the relationship between, these contrastivist theories.
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy Compassen
dc.rightsThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Snedegar, J (2015), Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought. Philosophy Compass, 10, 379–388, which has been published in final form at This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.en
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleContrastivism about reasons and oughten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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