Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies
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Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.
Beasley , R K & Kaarbo , J 2014 , ' Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies ' International Studies Quarterly , vol. 58 , no. 4 , pp. 729-740 . DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12164
International Studies Quarterly
© 2014 International Studies Association. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12164
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