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Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies
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dc.contributor.author | Beasley, Ryan K. | |
dc.contributor.author | Kaarbo, Juliet | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-02T00:32:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-12-02T00:32:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-12-11 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Beasley , R K & Kaarbo , J 2014 , ' Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies ' , International Studies Quarterly , vol. 58 , no. 4 , pp. 729-740 . https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12164 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-8833 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE: 162212908 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE UUID: 98a75fdb-d276-484c-8504-6f4a2e1b7598 | |
dc.identifier.other | WOS: 000346241200007 | |
dc.identifier.other | Scopus: 84916603194 | |
dc.identifier.other | WOS: 000346241200007 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0001-7928-6504/work/76386952 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9917 | |
dc.description | This investigation was financially supported by the University of Kansas General Research Fund. | en |
dc.description.abstract | Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy. | |
dc.format.extent | 12 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Studies Quarterly | en |
dc.rights | © 2014 International Studies Association. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12164 | en |
dc.subject | International conflict behavior | en |
dc.subject | Decision-making | en |
dc.subject | Institutional constraints | en |
dc.subject | Diversionary force | en |
dc.subject | Initiation | en |
dc.subject | Presidentialism | en |
dc.subject | Deficits | en |
dc.subject | Systems | en |
dc.subject | Peace | en |
dc.subject | JZ International relations | en |
dc.subject | BDC | en |
dc.subject | R2C | en |
dc.subject.lcc | JZ | en |
dc.title | Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.description.version | Postprint | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. School of International Relations | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Centre for Global Law and Governance | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12164 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.embargoedUntil | 2016-12-01 |
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