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dc.contributor.authorVolpi, Frederic
dc.contributor.authorStein, Ewan
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-26T23:34:36Z
dc.date.available2016-09-26T23:34:36Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationVolpi , F & Stein , E 2015 , ' Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings : between people power and state power ' , Democratization , vol. 22 , no. 2 , pp. 276-293 . https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010811en
dc.identifier.issn1351-0347
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 179933803
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 9be8dbbc-1e76-404c-a4c6-17df33385bba
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84929025390
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000353453000005
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/9561
dc.descriptionThe authors would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for facilitating the research for this article through their support of the research network People Power versus State Power of the Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World.en
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt).
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofDemocratizationen
dc.rightsCopyright 2015 Taylor & Francis. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010811en
dc.subjectIslamismen
dc.subjectState institutionsen
dc.subjectConflicten
dc.subjectTransnationalismen
dc.subjectIdeologyen
dc.subjectArab uprisingsen
dc.subjectJZ International relationsen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subjectSDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutionsen
dc.subject.lccJZen
dc.titleIslamism and the state after the Arab uprisings : between people power and state poweren
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorArts and Humanities Research Councilen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of International Relationsen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010811
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2016-09-26
dc.identifier.grantnumberen


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