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dc.contributor.authorBarberà, Salvador
dc.contributor.authorBeviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.authorPonsatí, Clara
dc.identifier.citationBarberà , S , Beviá , C & Ponsatí , C 2015 , ' Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations ' , Games and Economic Behavior , vol. 91 , pp. 237–257 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 196258128
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 0f16636f-2698-45d9-84f3-7aa03c27614a
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84937978374
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000356989600015
dc.descriptionWe gratefully acknowledge support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075). Barberà and Beviá acknowledge support from grants “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, and SGR2014-515. Ponsatí acknowledges support from grants ECO2012-37065, and SGR2009-1142.en
dc.description.abstractEgalitarianism and meritocracy are competing principles to distribute the joint benefits of cooperation. We examine the consequences of letting members of society vote between those two principles, in a context where individuals must join with others into coalitions of a certain size to become productive. Our setup induces a hedonic game of coalition formation. We study the existence of core stable partitions (organizational structures) of this game. We show that the inability of voters to commit to one distributional rule or another is a potential source of instability. But we also prove that, when stable organizational structures exist, they may be rich in form, and different than those predicted by alternative models of coalition formation. Non-segregated coalitions may arise within core stable structures. Stability is also compatible with the coexistence of meritocratic and egalitarian coalitions. These phenomena are robust, and persist under alternative variants of our initial model.
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavioren
dc.rightsCopyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. This is the author's version of this work. The published version is available at www.sciencedirect.comen
dc.subjectCoalition formationen
dc.subjectHedonic gamesen
dc.subjectCore stabilityen
dc.subjectAssortative matingen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.titleMeritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizationsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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