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Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure
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dc.contributor.author | Harkness, Kristen A. | |
dc.contributor.author | Hunzeker, Michael | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-08-29T08:30:12Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-08-29T08:30:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-09-19 | |
dc.identifier | 163422567 | |
dc.identifier | ffe8d2c3-c2ab-4e18-b42e-18a9c13cc83c | |
dc.identifier | 84942197389 | |
dc.identifier | 000361485800002 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Harkness , K A & Hunzeker , M 2015 , ' Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure ' , Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 38 , no. 6 , pp. 777-800 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.960078 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0140-2390 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0001-5882-3745/work/60427623 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9390 | |
dc.description.abstract | Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics. | |
dc.format.extent | 250797 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Strategic Studies | en |
dc.subject | Military adaptation | en |
dc.subject | Wartime learning | en |
dc.subject | Organizational change | en |
dc.subject | Counterinsurgency | en |
dc.subject | Tactics | en |
dc.subject | British Army | en |
dc.subject | Post-colonial Africa | en |
dc.subject | Clausewitz | en |
dc.subject | JZ International relations | en |
dc.subject | BDC | en |
dc.subject | R2C | en |
dc.subject.lcc | JZ | en |
dc.title | Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. School of International Relations | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/01402390.2014.960078 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
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