Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure
Abstract
Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.
Citation
Harkness , K A & Hunzeker , M 2015 , ' Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure ' , Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 38 , no. 6 , pp. 777-800 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.960078
Publication
Journal of Strategic Studies
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0140-2390Type
Journal article
Collections
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