Show simple item record

Files in this item


Item metadata

dc.contributor.advisorHawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
dc.contributor.advisorPriest, Graham
dc.contributor.advisorRead, Stephen
dc.contributor.authorKiourti, Ira Georgia
dc.description.abstractLewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion- beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.subjectImpossible worldsen_US
dc.subjectLewisian realism about possible worldsen_US
dc.subjectExtending Lewisian realism into impossible worldsen_US
dc.subjectLewisian modal realismen_US
dc.subjectReductive theories of modalityen_US
dc.subjectDavid Lewisen_US
dc.subjectImpossible worlds & the reduction of the modalen_US
dc.subjectErsatz impossibilia out of Lewis-worldsen_US
dc.subjectLewis-friendly ersatz worldsen_US
dc.subjectConcrete impossible worldsen_US
dc.subjectActual truth versus truth simpliciteren_US
dc.subjectNegation at concrete impossible worldsen_US
dc.subjectNegation commutationen_US
dc.subjectConcrete impossibilia & contradictionen_US
dc.subjectReasoning about Lewisian realism with impossibiliaen_US
dc.subjectModality as world similarityen_US
dc.subjectRelative Modalityen_US
dc.subjectRelative impossibiliaen_US
dc.subjectLogical similarity between worldsen_US
dc.subject"The logical laws of w"en_US
dc.subjectRepresenting impossibilities about the pluralityen_US
dc.subjectConcrete impossibilismen_US
dc.subjectTruth-at-w & literal truthen_US
dc.subject.lcshLewis, David K., 1941-en_US
dc.subject.lcshModality (Logic)en_US
dc.titleReal impossible worlds : the bounds of possibilityen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorArts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)en_US
dc.contributor.sponsorUniversity of St Andrewsen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentArché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen_US

The following licence files are associated with this item:

  • Creative Commons

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's licence for re-use is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported