The Grail of original meaning: uses of the past in American constitutional theory
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Originalist jurisprudence, which enjoins a faithful adherence to the values enshrined in the late eighteenth-century Constitution, has become a prominent feature of contemporary American conservatism. Recovering the original meaning of the Constitution is far from straightforward, and raises major issues of historical interpretation. How far do the assumed historical underpinnings of originalist interpretation mesh with the findings of academic historians? To what extent has the conservative invocation of the Founding Fathers obscured a lost American Enlightenment? Nor is ‘tradition’ in American constitutional law an unproblematic matter. How far does a desire to restore the original meaning of the Constitution ignore the role of ‘stare decisis’ [precedent] in America’s common law heritage? It transpires, moreover, that the various schemes of historical interpretation in American constitutional jurisprudence do not map easily onto a simple liberal-conservative divide.
Kidd , C C 2016 , ' The Grail of original meaning: uses of the past in American constitutional theory ' Transactions of the Royal Historical Society , vol. Sixth series 26 , pp. 175-196 . DOI: 10.1017/S0080440116000104
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
© Royal Historical Society 2016. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080440116000104
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