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dc.contributor.authorGlick, E.
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-17T10:10:17Z
dc.date.available2016-02-17T10:10:17Z
dc.date.issued2015-09
dc.identifier.citationGlick , E 2015 , ' Practical modes of presentation ' , Noûs , vol. 49 , no. 3 , pp. 538-559 . https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12052en
dc.identifier.issn0029-4624
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 209411462
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 87d59d9b-41af-4e24-8ac8-3a268cf91e06
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84937969474
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000358438300007
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/8246
dc.description.abstractThe Intellectualist thesis that know-how is a kind of propositional knowledge faces a simple problem: For any proposition p, it seems that one could know p without knowing how to do the activity in question. For example, it seems that one could know that w is a way to swim even if one didn't know how to swim oneself. In this paper I argue that this "sufficiency problem" cannot be adequately addressed by appealing to practical modes of presentation.
dc.format.extent22
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofNoûsen
dc.rights© 2013, Wiley Periodicals Inc. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12052en
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titlePractical modes of presentationen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. University of St Andrewsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12052
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2015-10-11


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