Practical modes of presentation

dc.contributor.author	Glick, E.
dc.date.accessioned	2016-02-17T10:10:17Z
dc.date.available	2016-02-17T10:10:17Z
dc.date.issued	2015-09
dc.identifier	209411462
dc.identifier	87d59d9b-41af-4e24-8ac8-3a268cf91e06
dc.identifier	84937969474
dc.identifier	000358438300007
dc.identifier.citation	Glick , E 2015 , ' Practical modes of presentation ' , Noûs , vol. 49 , no. 3 , pp. 538-559 . https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12052	en
dc.identifier.issn	0029-4624
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8246
dc.description.abstract	The Intellectualist thesis that know-how is a kind of propositional knowledge faces a simple problem: For any proposition p, it seems that one could know p without knowing how to do the activity in question. For example, it seems that one could know that w is a way to swim even if one didn't know how to swim oneself. In this paper I argue that this "sufficiency problem" cannot be adequately addressed by appealing to practical modes of presentation.
dc.format.extent	22
dc.format.extent	428794
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Noûs	en
dc.subject	B Philosophy (General)	en
dc.subject.lcc	B1	en
dc.title	Practical modes of presentation	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. University of St Andrews	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. Philosophy	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1111/nous.12052
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed	en
dc.date.embargoedUntil	2015-10-11