Practical modes of presentation
Abstract
The Intellectualist thesis that know-how is a kind of propositional knowledge faces a simple problem: For any proposition p, it seems that one could know p without knowing how to do the activity in question. For example, it seems that one could know that w is a way to swim even if one didn't know how to swim oneself. In this paper I argue that this "sufficiency problem" cannot be adequately addressed by appealing to practical modes of presentation.
Citation
Glick , E 2015 , ' Practical modes of presentation ' , Noûs , vol. 49 , no. 3 , pp. 538-559 . https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12052
Publication
Noûs
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0029-4624Type
Journal article
Collections
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