Practical modes of presentation
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The Intellectualist thesis that know-how is a kind of propositional knowledge faces a simple problem: For any proposition p, it seems that one could know p without knowing how to do the activity in question. For example, it seems that one could know that w is a way to swim even if one didn't know how to swim oneself. In this paper I argue that this "sufficiency problem" cannot be adequately addressed by appealing to practical modes of presentation.
Glick , E 2015 , ' Practical modes of presentation ' Noûs , vol 49 , no. 3 , pp. 538-559 . DOI: 10.1111/nous.12052
© 2013, Wiley Periodicals Inc. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12052