Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorRead, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-12T11:10:08Z
dc.date.available2016-02-12T11:10:08Z
dc.date.issued2016-02-09
dc.identifier.citationRead , S 2016 , ' Harmonic inferentialism and the logic of identity ' The Review of Symbolic Logic . DOI: 10.1017/S1755020316000010en
dc.identifier.issn1755-0203
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 240305567
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 65b232f2-0f73-4755-aa23-e69b3267769a
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84957810550
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/8212
dc.description.abstractInferentialism claims that the rules for the use of an expression express its meaning without any need to invoke meanings or denotations for them. Logical inferentialism endorses inferentialism specically for the logical constants. Harmonic inferentialism, as the term is introduced here, usually but not necessarily a subbranch of logical inferentialism, follows Gentzen in proposing that it is the introduction-rules whch give expressions their meaning and the elimination-rules should accord harmoniously with the meaning so given. It is proposed here that the logical expressions are those which can be given schematic rules that lie in a specific sort of harmony, general-elimination (ge) harmony, resulting from applying a certain operation, the ge-procedure, to produce ge-rules in accord with the meaning defined by the I-rules. Griffiths (2014) claims that identity cannot be given such rules, concluding that logical inferentialists are committed to ruling identity a non-logical expression. It is shown that the schematic rules for identity given in Read (2004), slightly amended, are indeed ge-harmonious, so confirming that identity is a logical notion.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Symbolic Logicen
dc.rightsCopyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2016. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000010en
dc.subjectInferentialismen
dc.subjectIdentityen
dc.subjectInversion principleen
dc.subjectHarmonyen
dc.subjectProof-theoretic semanticsen
dc.subjectGentzenen
dc.subjectLorenzenen
dc.subjectPrawitzen
dc.subjectDummetten
dc.subjectBrandomen
dc.subjectGriffithsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleHarmonic inferentialism and the logic of identityen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. St Andrews Institute of Mediaeval Studiesen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000010
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttp://journals.cambridge.org/repo_A108EoJ3iqKOjs


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record