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dc.contributor.authorWeatherson, Brian James
dc.identifier.citationWeatherson , B J 2015 , ' For Bayesians, rational modesty requires imprecision ' , Ergo , vol. 2 , no. 20 , 20 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 220298289
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: e9ad89c2-1a40-409d-8ffe-bd1fba07518d
dc.description.abstractGordon Belot (2013) has recently developed a novel argument against Bayesianism. He shows that there is an interesting class of problems that, intuitively, no rational belief forming method is likely to get right. But a Bayesian agent’s credence, before the problem starts, that she will get the problem right has to be 1. This is an implausible kind of immodesty on the part of Bayesians. My aim is to show that while this is a good argument against traditional, precise Bayesians, the argument doesn’t neatly extend to imprecise Bayesians. As such, Belot’s argument is a reason to prefer imprecise Bayesianism to precise Bayesianism.
dc.rightsCopyright 2015 the Author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.en
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleFor Bayesians, rational modesty requires imprecisionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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