A neglected resolution of Russell's paradox of propositions
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Bertrand Russell offered an influential paradox of propositions in Appendix B of "The Principles of Mathematics", but there is little agreement as to what to conclude from it. We suggest that Russell’s paradox is best regarded as a limitative result on propositional granularity. Some propositions are, on pain of contradiction, unable to discriminate between classes with different members: whatever they predicate of one, they predicate of the other. When accepted, this remarkable fact should cast some doubt upon some of the uses to which modern descendants of Russell’s paradox of propositions have been put in recent literature.
Uzquiano , G 2015 , ' A neglected resolution of Russell's paradox of propositions ' The Review of Symbolic Logic , vol. 8 , no. 2 , pp. 328-344 . DOI: 10.1017/S1755020315000106
The Review of Symbolic Logic
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755020315000106
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