Who's afraid of determinism?

dc.contributor.author	Stevenson, Leslie
dc.date.accessioned	2015-01-10T00:01:31Z
dc.date.available	2015-01-10T00:01:31Z
dc.date.issued	2014-07
dc.identifier	148897933
dc.identifier	e8496ced-3dd9-429e-b2ca-356e3e8f3bc9
dc.identifier	000337757200004
dc.identifier	84902686469
dc.identifier	000337757200004
dc.identifier.citation	Stevenson , L 2014 , ' Who's afraid of determinism? ' , Philosophy , vol. 89 , no. 3 , pp. 431-450 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819113000867	en
dc.identifier.issn	0031-8191
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5985
dc.description.abstract	Because of the idealizations involved in the ideas of a total state of the world and of all the laws of nature, the thesis of all-encompassing determinism is unverifiable. Our everyday non-scientific talk of causation does not imply determinism; nor is it needed for the Kantian argument for a general causal framework as a condition for experience of an objective world. Determinism is at best a regulative ideal for science, something to be approached but never reached.
dc.format.extent	20
dc.format.extent	262810
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Philosophy	en
dc.subject	B Philosophy (General)	en
dc.subject.lcc	B1	en
dc.title	Who's afraid of determinism?	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. Philosophy	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1017/S0031819113000867
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed	en
dc.date.embargoedUntil	2015-01-10