Who's afraid of determinism?
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Because of the idealizations involved in the ideas of a total state of the world and of all the laws of nature, the thesis of all-encompassing determinism is unverifiable. Our everyday non-scientific talk of causation does not imply determinism; nor is it needed for the Kantian argument for a general causal framework as a condition for experience of an objective world. Determinism is at best a regulative ideal for science, something to be approached but never reached.
Stevenson , L 2014 , ' Who's afraid of determinism? ' Philosophy , vol 89 , no. 3 , pp. 431-450 . DOI: 10.1017/S0031819113000867
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