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Stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks

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dc.contributor.authorHatfield, John William
dc.contributor.authorKominers, Scott Duke
dc.contributor.authorNichifor, Alexandru
dc.contributor.authorOstrovsky, Michael
dc.contributor.authorWestkamp, Alexander
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-30T23:01:45Z
dc.date.available2014-09-30T23:01:45Z
dc.date.issued2013-10
dc.identifier.citationHatfield , J W , Kominers , S D , Nichifor , A , Ostrovsky , M & Westkamp , A 2013 , ' Stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks ' , Journal of Political Economy , vol. 121 , no. 5 , pp. 966-1005 . https://doi.org/10.1086/673402en
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 74151186
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 889ee01f-278b-4638-b1cc-2a0c0c4b5d31
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84890962386
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/5519
dc.descriptionKominers thanks the National Science Foundation (grant CCF-1216095 and a graduate research fellowship), the Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Program, the John M. Olin Center (a Terence M. Considine Fellowship), the American Mathematical Society, and the Simons Foundation for support. Nichifor thanks the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grant VIDI-452-06-013) and the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics for support. Ostrovsky thanks the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for support. Westkamp thanks the German Science Foundation for support.en
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasilinear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure. Furthermore, the set of stable outcomes is essentially equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria, and all stable outcomes are in the core and are efficient. By contrast, for any domain of preferences strictly larger than that of full substitutability, the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed.
dc.format.extent40
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Political Economyen
dc.rights© 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.en
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleStability and competitive equilibrium in trading networksen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/673402
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2014-10-01


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