Stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks
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We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasilinear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure. Furthermore, the set of stable outcomes is essentially equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria, and all stable outcomes are in the core and are efficient. By contrast, for any domain of preferences strictly larger than that of full substitutability, the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed.
Hatfield , J W , Kominers , S D , Nichifor , A , Ostrovsky , M & Westkamp , A 2013 , ' Stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks ' Journal of Political Economy , vol 121 , no. 5 , pp. 966-1005 . DOI: 10.1086/673402
Journal of Political Economy
© 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
Kominers thanks the National Science Foundation (grant CCF-1216095 and a graduate research fellowship), the Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Program, the John M. Olin Center (a Terence M. Considine Fellowship), the American Mathematical Society, and the Simons Foundation for support. Nichifor thanks the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grant VIDI-452-06-013) and the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics for support. Ostrovsky thanks the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for support. Westkamp thanks the German Science Foundation for support.
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