Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts
MetadataShow full item record
Contrastivism about `ought' holds that `ought' claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets of mutually exclusive but not necessarily jointly exhaustive alternatives. This kind of theory can solve puzzles that face other linguistic theories of `ought', via the rejection or severe restriction of principles that let us make inferences between`ought' claims. By rejecting or restricting these principles, however, the contrastivist takes on a burden of recapturing acceptable inferences that these principles let us make. This paper investigates the extent to which a contrastivist can do this.
Snedegar , J 2014 , Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts . in F Cariani , D Grossi , J Meheus & X Parent (eds) , Deontic Logic and Normative Systems : 12th International Conference, DEON 2014 . vol. 8554 , Lecture Notes in Computer Science , Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries) , Springer , Switzerland , pp. 208-223 .
Deontic Logic and Normative Systems
Non peer reviewed
© 2014 Springer. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Lecture Notes on Computer Science, subseries Lecture Notes on Artificial Intelligence 2014. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_16
Items in the St Andrews Research Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.