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Title: McDowell, Gettier, and the bipartite account of perceptual knowledge
Authors: Archer, Adrian Avery
Supervisors: Wright, Crispin
Keywords: Epistemology
Perceptual knowledge
Philosophy of perception
John McDowell
Issue Date: 27-Jun-2008
Abstract: In his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.” In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification. To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive. On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge. My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail. Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.
Type: Thesis
Publisher: University of St Andrews
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Theses

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