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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-23T10:01:03Z
dc.date.available2013-12-23T10:01:03Z
dc.date.issued2013-11
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y & Ulph , D T 2013 , ' Antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overcharges ' , The Economic Journal , vol. 123 , no. 572 , pp. F558-F581 . https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12075en
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 26317747
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 531a1bdb-8ac8-4b5e-870d-307d74e4824e
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84888306414
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464515
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/4310
dc.descriptionResearch for this paper was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council RES-062-23-2211en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we provide a number of extensions to the theory of antitrust fines and we use these, with existing and new datasets, to contribute to a better understanding of the current fining policies of Competition Authorities. In particular, we extend the theory linking cartel overcharges to optimal fines by introducing a number of additional considerations that authorities should take into account in setting fines and that are ignored by the existing literature. We then use existing empirical evidence on cartels and a new dataset relating to Abuse of Dominance cases to show that existing levels of fines are within the range supported by calculations of optimal fines. We then examine the reverse issue of how the toughness of the antitrust regime affects the level of cartel overcharges. We show that the effects are highly ambiguous, thus questioning some of the recent empirical findings on this issue, and the potential benefits of raising penalties.
dc.format.extent30
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofThe Economic Journalen
dc.rights(c) 2013 Royal Economic Society, published by Wiley. This is the accepted version of this article, deposited in accordance with publisher policies.en
dc.rights© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons on behalf of the Royal Economic Society. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.en
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleAntitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overchargesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorEconomic & Social Research Councilen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12075
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.identifier.grantnumberRES-062-23-2211en


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