Antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overcharges
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In this paper we provide a number of extensions to the theory of antitrust fines and we use these, with existing and new datasets, to contribute to a better understanding of the current fining policies of Competition Authorities. In particular, we extend the theory linking cartel overcharges to optimal fines by introducing a number of additional considerations that authorities should take into account in setting fines and that are ignored by the existing literature. We then use existing empirical evidence on cartels and a new dataset relating to Abuse of Dominance cases to show that existing levels of fines are within the range supported by calculations of optimal fines. We then examine the reverse issue of how the toughness of the antitrust regime affects the level of cartel overcharges. We show that the effects are highly ambiguous, thus questioning some of the recent empirical findings on this issue, and the potential benefits of raising penalties.
Katsoulacos , Y & Ulph , D T 2013 , ' Antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overcharges ' The Economic Journal , vol 123 , no. 572 , pp. F558-F581 . DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12075
The Economic Journal
(c) 2013 Royal Economic Society, published by Wiley. This is the accepted version of this article, deposited in accordance with publisher policies.© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons on behalf of the Royal Economic Society. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council RES-062-23-2211
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