John Locke on persons and personal identity
Abstract
John Locke claims both that ‘person’ is a forensic term and that personal
identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is
to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account
of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of
consciousness.
My interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity is
embedded in Locke’s sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke’s sortal-dependent
account of identity provides an important theoretical framework
for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke’s account of personhood
is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My
approach gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term,
because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal
kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that
two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in
sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception
of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of
just accountability and just reward and punishment.
Given one accepts Locke’s conception of a person and his understanding
of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke
regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but
the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also
sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke’s account of
persons and personal identity within Locke’s epistemological, metaphysical
and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective,
the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and
that it is a verbal question whether Locke’s term ‘consciousness’ refers not
only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying
ontological constitution.
Type
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
Rights
Embargo Date: 2018-05-23
Embargo Reason: Thesis restricted in accordance with University regulations. Print and electronic copy restricted until 23rd May 2023
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