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The answering machine paradox
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dc.contributor.advisor | Greenough, Patrick | |
dc.contributor.author | Gudmundsson, David | |
dc.coverage.spatial | 159 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-24T08:32:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-24T08:32:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3150 | |
dc.description.abstract | The answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of St Andrews | |
dc.subject.lcc | P325.5I54G8 | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Indexicals (Semantics) | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Kaplan, David|q(David Benjamin), 1933- | en_US |
dc.title | The answering machine paradox | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.type.qualificationlevel | Doctoral | en_US |
dc.type.qualificationname | MPhil Master of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.publisher.institution | The University of St Andrews | en_US |
dc.rights.embargodate | Print and electronic copy restricted until 8th June 2017 | en_US |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Thesis restricted in accordance with University regulations | en_US |
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