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dc.contributor.advisorGreenough, Patrick
dc.contributor.authorGudmundsson, David
dc.coverage.spatial159en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-24T08:32:32Z
dc.date.available2012-09-24T08:32:32Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3150
dc.description.abstractThe answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subject.lccP325.5I54G8
dc.subject.lcshIndexicals (Semantics)en_US
dc.subject.lcshKaplan, David|q(David Benjamin), 1933-en_US
dc.titleThe answering machine paradoxen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhil Master of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.rights.embargodatePrint and electronic copy restricted until 8th June 2017en_US
dc.rights.embargoreasonThesis restricted in accordance with University regulationsen_US


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