The answering machine paradox
Abstract
The answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions.
Type
Thesis, MPhil Master of Philosophy
Rights
Embargo Date: Print and electronic copy restricted until 8th June 2017
Embargo Reason: Thesis restricted in accordance with University regulations
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