Hume's theory of obligation : morality between nature and artifice

Abstract

Hume’s account of obligation has been widely discussed in the literature, but many aspects of his conception of obligation, including its definition, taxonomy, and scope, are still subjects of interpretative controversy. Some scholars read his concept of moral obligation as denoting a determining motive in regard to moral values, while some read it as identical to the approbation of virtue which cannot motivate by itself. I argue against both views in this thesis. The primary concern of Hume’s account of obligation, in my reading, is not with motivation but with accommodating moral obligation in a virtue-centred moral theory. For him, the sentiment of moral obligation is a specific form of disapprobation, and it has different features when felt about ‘natural virtues’ like benevolence and ‘artificial virtues’ like justice. Noteworthily, for justice, considerations about law and obligation precede those about character, which makes justice an anomalous case for Hume’s virtue-centred theory, and he develops an account of the conventional origin of justice to explain its law-regulated features. The idea of obligation, on this account, arises from principles in human nature in a social and historical process but has features in tension with such principles’ natural inclinations. In Chapter 1, I delineate the basic features of Hume’s conception of obligation from both positive and negative perspectives. Chapter 2 discusses his taxonomy of obligation in the light of its relationship to natural law theories. Chapter 3 examines the nature, origin, and scope of the sentiment of moral obligation. Chapter 4 explores how concerns about features of the obligation to justice motivate Hume to propose a distinction between natural and artificial virtues. Then, Chapter 5 discusses how Hume constructs a genealogical account to explain the anomalous features of justice, and Chapter 6 explores whether and how this account can do its job.